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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND PROCEDURE FOLLOWED
In all branches of learning there is a perennial need
to check-up on material to determine if progress is being
made and to note where a dead-end has been reached or actual
retrogression has taken place.
more

ne~essary

In no field is this check-up

than in the field of theology and philosophy.
I.

THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem.

The problem of this study

has been to determine if Arminian theology in America, as
represented by two of her most influential theologians, has
been true to the philosophy and theology of John Wesley and,
also, to determine if they have advanced this thought in any
significant manner.

More generally the problem of this study

has been to delineate the main current of Wesleyan-Arminian
theology.

Randolph

s.

Foster and John Miley, consecutively

professors of theology at Drew Theological Seminary in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, were chosen as
representing the most influential school of Arminian theology
in America.

In this study, comparison has continually been

made of the chosen American representatives with the three
most influential British theologians, Wesley, Watson, and
Pope. ·
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Justification of the study.

The tragic confusion of

contemporary theology, which is but a reflection of the
confusion of

contempora~y

thought in general, has prompted

this study.

To return to bed-rock in philosophy and theology

has been the urgent need of our generation.

The reign of

Kant and Hegel in philosophy came to an end in the last
century.

New leaders, such as Bergson and James, came to

power with the beginning of the present century.

These men

were unable to occupy for long the place of authority.
Bergson's two most promising students, Maritain and Gilson,
turned Neo-Thomist and became its most brilliant contemporary
representatives.

At a time when the material logic of Hegel

was all but dead in the field of pure philosophy it was very
much alive in the fields of theology and the philosophy of
history.

Contemporary theology has been snowed under by an

avalanche of authors who have been forcing theology through
the forms of Hegelian dialectics.

The theology of John

Wesley, though it has escaped largely the dialectical plague,
has suffered from severe corrosion, both of its philosophical
basis and in its very vitals.
Historical background.

America has not had a

reputation for great originality in its thinking.

Even its

political thought has been largely borrowed from Europe.
Until recently its philosophy and theology also
Europe.

ca~e

from

Now one or two American philosophers have been
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successful in starting the current flowing in the opposite
direction.

However, these currents came at too late a date

to profoundly influence the thought of Europe.
the form of Calvinism 1 arrived first in America.

Theology, in
Arminianism

and Lutheranism came about a century and a half later.

The

Friends represented a Protestant group who were early
residents in America, but their contribution was practice
rather than theology.

Philosophy, in the form of Locke's

Essay, came to influence lonely thinkers like Jonathan
Edwards, and Berkeley's personal visits were appreciated by
the same lonely men.

However, on the whole, the currents of

philosophy flowing into America were not strong.

Political

thought and science, together with literature, were the chief
intellectual supplies imported, aside from theology which
constituted the main stream.

By the time the new nation was

established all three of Protestantism's great branches were
facing each other and, unwilling to compromise in order to
unite, were set to battle it out.

Each of the three groups

had an abundance of European theological thought ready at
hand.

The need was to bring this material into clear form

and shape it for use in the close struggle that was to follow
in the death grapple of theologies.
It was only after the smoke of battle had somewhat
subsided, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, that
the greatest of these clarifying works appeared in all camps.
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At this time the Calvinists were ably represented by Charles
Hodge.

Foster and Miley, representing the Arminians, pointed

their arguments largely against Hodge.

It is a point worthy

of note that, at this same time, other works also appeared on
eschatology, revision of the Scriptures, and exegesis.
Joseph Seiss' monumental work on the Apocalypse represented
the Lutheran group.

Philip Schaff's labors, in heading the

committee which produced the American Standard Version of the
Bible, represented a united group.

Daniel Steele's original

work in the Greek Testament was an important contribution to
Arminian theology.

His studies strengthened the doctrine of

entire sanctification, giving it the weight of sharper
interpretation in passages which employed meaningful Greek
verb tenses.
Prior to the appearance of these great argumentative
works, the work of evangelization had progressed across the
continent, and the large major denominations had staked their
claims, shaped their empires, and finished the rough pioneering
work.

It is important to note, that, just prior to the Civil

War, great revivals swept the nation on a scale unprecedented
before or since, so that at heart America was a profoundly
Christian nation.

The schools at that time were too few end

too small to adequately educate America in the fine points of
theology, yet the Bible was read there as well as in the
homes and churches.

The preachers, though largely self-
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educated in the Arminian movement, read the basic works of
their denomination, especially the early writers, such as
Wesley and Fletcher, so that many of them had a profound·
grasp of the cardinal doctrines of their theology.

They

preached doctrine to their people and thus grounded them in
the important teachings of their church.

The denominational

disciplines were also rigidly followed in those early days.
After the Civil War the picture changed.

The

tremendous increase of wealth, due to the rapid industrial
expansion, brought into American life the flood of secularism
which all but destroyed vital Christianity.

It was upon this

secular stream that liberal theology rode into power.

Foster

and Miley witnessed the onrush of this current and felt its
power.

Perhaps it was more in recapitulation than in

profound influence that the works of Foster and Miley stand,
in their relation to Arminien thought in America.

At any

rate they furnish the clearest expression of that thought in
America.

The originality of a towering thinker like Jonathan

Edwards, who stands as a lonely peak in American philosophy,
cannot be claimed for Foster and Miley.

The latter were

clarifiers of thought already current in theology.

However,

even such thinkers can turn up new problems and supply new
solutions.

They emerged from a triumphant movement that had

won success all over America and had become embodied in the
largest single Protestant denomination.

The Methodists won
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their success not only by the zeal of their evangelism, but
also by the quality of their theology.

Even sons of

established Calvinist families were won to Arminianism.
Daniel Steele, the direct descendant of the father of David
Brainerd, the prospective son-in-law of Jonathan Edwards, was
an

example of such a trophy.
II.

THE PROCEDURE FOLLOw'ED

Limita.tions of the studi•

This study has been limited

to a few cardinal points of theology which have been the
storm centers over which Arminian and Calvinist thought have
fought their rounds.
and soteriology.

These are the subJects of anthropology

Also included in this study have been the

philosophical basis of theology, the relation of reason to
revelation, e.nd the inspiration of the Scriptures.
Comparison

"t~Tith

basic works.

The procedure of this

study has been to compare the contributions, on these topics,
of Foster and Miley, 'tl'rhichever one was the stronger, with the
basic works of Wesley, Watson, and Pope.

The work of Foster

has been used entirely on the philosophical basis of theology.
Miley has been used entirely on the topics of anthropology
and soteriology, with the exception of the sub-topic of
entire sanctification, in the handling of which both men have
been used.

This study has used Locke's Essay of the Human

Understanding to check Foster 1 s Prolegomena and Theism.
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Miley, in developing his topics, made many references to the
works of Wesley, Watson, and Pope.

Thus the work of this part

of the study became not a comparison but a check on Miley to
determine if his conclusions were valid.

CHAPTER II
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS OF THEOLOGY
The service of philosophy to theology has been an
important one.

The most influential theologians have colored

for good or for evil their systems of theology by their
philosophical commitments.
I.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Luther's philosophical commitments.

Lutherl had not

been trained in the philosophy of Aristotle.
regard for any philosophy.

He had little

The most influential minds in his

background were those of Augustine and the German mystics,
notably John Tauler.
Augustine.

John Calvin2 also adhered closely to

Thus, Augustine became a dominant force in the

theologies of both the Lutherans and the Calvinists.

Neither

Lutheran nor Calvinistic theology gave much place to the
philosophical basis of theology.

Neither Luther nor

Ce~vin

committed themselves to the logic and metaphysics of
Aristotle.
Wesley 8 s acceptance of Aristotle.

That Wesley

1 Julius Koestlin, "Martin Luther, n The New SchaffHerzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, VII~9-70.
2 Benjamin B. Warfield, ncalvinism and Lutheranism, 11
The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, II,

360.
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committed himself to the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle
can be ·inferred from a reference which he made to Locke in
the following quotation.
In reading over the second volume of Mr. Locke's Essay
I was much disappointed: it is by no means equal to the
first. The more I consider it, the more convinced I was
that his ~rand design was, (vain design!) to drive
Aristotle s logic out of the world, which he hated
cordially, but never understood: I suppose, because he
had an unskillful master, and read bad books upon the
subject.3
It has been of interest to this writer to determine if
Foster and Miley appreciated the Aristotelian background of
Wesleyan theology.
Puritan background.

The early schools of America came from a
Thus the oldest colleges were

Calvinistic and did not teach Aristotelian philosophy.

The

study of philosophy came into American Protestant schools at
a much later date.
II.

FOSTER 1 S PROLEGOMENA AND THEISM

Foster's debt to Locke.

In the Prolegomena Foster

made several references to Locke's Essay.

The influence of

this book is evident throughout the Prolegomena.

It has

seemed important to review fragments of the Essay, pertinent
portions which deal most directly with the problems treated
in the Prolegomena.
Locke's Essay has influenced several outstanding

lg31)

I

3 John Wesley, Works (New York: J. Emory and B. Waugh,
VII, p. 44g.
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theologians.

Wesley had a high regard for Locke, correcting

him principally where he departed from the logic and
metaphysics of Aristotle.

Jonathan Edwards, who had access

to few books, early became acquainted with Locke and prized
him highly, but in his mature thinking he accepted Leibnitz 1
corrections on Locke.

Leibnitz, as he himself confessed,

stood in relation to Locke somewhat as Plato had stood in
relation to Aristotle.

Edwards, largely self-educated in

philosophy, was never led to see the basic importance of
Aristotle.
In the opinion of Wesley, Locke nowhere in his Essay
showed himself more masterful than in Book One, in which he
refuted arguments for the innateness of ideas and principles.
This work of clearing the ground of all debris, in order that
the structure of knowledge might arise upon a clean foundation,
was, to Wesley, an important accomplishment.

Wesley wrote:

I think that point, that we have no innate principles
is abundantly proved, and cleared from all objects that
have any shadow of strength, and it was highly needful to
prove the point at large, as all that follows rests on
this foundation; and as it was at that time an utter
paradox both in the philosophical and the religious world.4
Foster leaned heavily upon Locke.

He took over from

Locke the notion that, to begin with, the mind is void of
ideas--a mere tabula ~·

4 Ibid.

I

Like Locke,5 he differentiated

p. 445.

5 John Locke, An Essay Concerning the Human Understanding
(London: George Routledge and Sons Limited cn.d. 3 ) , pp. 491 ff.
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truth: (1) truth of being, (2) truth of concept (mental
truth), (3) truth of sign (verbal truth), (4) moral truth.
A notable differentiation in the thought of Foster and
Locke was that of idea and concept.

Idea, to Locke,6 was

anything that comprised the content of the mind.
use the notion of concepts.

He did not

To Foster, the ideas was

primarily that which existed in the mind of God prior to man's
creation and served as the archetype for his creation.7

When

a concept corresponds with the idea completely it becomes
identified with an idea.
Unlike Locke, who constructed his structure of
knowledge on the foundation of simple ideas, Foster took
concepts ready at hand and proceeded from there.

A

thoroughgoing philosophical basis to the sciences must be
constructed upon the bedrock of some sort of simples.
Prolegomen~

In his

Foster posited the existence of God as the basic

stone in the foundation of theology.

However, in that book,

he did not attempt to establish the philosophical ground upon
which the proof of God's existence rests.
for his Theism.

This was preserved

To Foster, the crux of the whole problem of

demonstrating the existence of God lay in being able to show
that the changes in matter clearly show an extra-mat erial

-' 6

!bid.~;-pp.

4-5.

7 Randolph S. Foster, Prolegomena (vol. I, Randolph s.
Foster, editor, S~udies in Theology, 4 vols.; New York: Hunt
and Eaton, 1890-1895), pp. 62 ff.
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cause. g

This required an ability of mind to clearly grasp

what is involved in the notion of causality.

Foster posited

the notion that the mind could arrive at a clear conception
of causality though it could not grasp what was involved in
such a notion.9

For example, though man knows that a first

cause brought the world into being he does not know the
manner in 'JArhich it was brought into being.
by Foster we.s purely

fl

metaphysical one.

This assumption
It was based on the

necessity of the mind in thinking about reality.lO

Hume 1 s

sequence of events, which ha.d been posited to take the place
of causation, Foster rejected as being

11

wretched cavil.nll

The principle of causality was, for Foster, necessary
to the life of reason.

The mind in its thinking about

reality, to avoid intellectual suicide, must recognize the
validity of this principle.

Once the principle of causality

is recognized the mind is driven to recognize that matter
cannot initiate action.

The mind is able to have clear

notions of the distinction between mind and matter.

The mind

is able to see deeper than the phenomena of nature and is
able to recognize that there is a power behind nature.

The

... uS Randolph s. Foster, Theism {vol. II, Randolph s.
Foster, editor, Studies in Theologl, 4 vole.; New York: Hunt
and Eaton, 1g90-1S95) , p. 90.
9 Ibid.

p. 91.

I

10 Ibid., p. 90.
11 Ibid.

I

p. g4.
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mind of man does not rest until it arrives at an ultimate
cause of s~l things.l2
To Foster, the demonstration of God 1 s existence had
metaphysical roots which were imbedded in the life of reason
in such a manner that they could not be removed without
destroying that life.
Foster's ~resupposition~. The basic presuppositions
of Foster1 3 were that the mind inevitably and by necessity
forms concepts both of itself and

o~

other beings.

From the

process of forming these concepts emerges such postulates as
that mind exists and hence there is an ego, that there is
objective reality, that concepts exist, and that there is an
exact correspondence between the concept and the objective
reality.

Foster did not attempt to give reasons for positing

his presuppositions but simply took them as basic without
needing validation.

He assumed their necessity in beginning

any sort of intellectual pursuit.

He dogmatically asserted

such notions as: (l} there is an external, concrete universe;
(2) there are minds; (3) the external concrete does become an
object of thought by or to mind or minds.l4

Foster by-passed

the skeptical approach and simply took for granted the
presuppositions of enquiry.
.

No attempt was made by Foster to

12 Ibid., p. 1S5.

13 Foster,

Prolegomen~,

p. 54.

answer the skepticism of Hume; in fact, the
no reference to Hume.

Prolegomen~

makes

With the statements of his

presuppositions, Foster proceeded to build his structure of
knowledge.
Foster's

epistemolo~.

The mind though starting with

sensations quickly transcends them and rises into the realm
of super-sensible ideas. 1 5 Following Locke closely, Foster
briefly described the acquistion of such ideas as those of
space, time, and power.16

The Christian epistemology,

according to Foster, postulates the existence of ideas before
things.

He wrote:

In tracing the history of the human idea, we found that
concrete reality is antecedent to the concept, and its
synthesis with mind, the ground of the concept. The
world of human concepts is offspring of the world of
realities, and a transcript of them in thought.
But now when we turn to the world of realities, to
examine them, we find that the case is reversed: the
realities are transcripts of pre-existing ideas--the idea
is older than the reality. As we push investigation, we
discover that the concrete universe falls within the
limits of time--that once it was non-existent. But we
know that had there been no reality or being of any kind,
then no being could ever have existed, as that would
involve the coming of all reality from the empty womb of
nothing, in contradiction of the axiom intuitively
perceived to be a necessary truth, ~ nihilo nihil !!1,
or, more generally formulated, there can be no effect
without a cause.
But now, when continuing the investigation, we pass
out beyond all objective reality--that is, all dependent
15 Ibid., p.

6o.

16 ~• 1 P• 61.
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being, or being originating in time, and come to that
antecedent, independent, eternal reality, the then only
form of being, we are compelled to conceive it as
possessing the idea of the as yet non-existing universe,
as it is impossible it should give concreteness to ideas
which it did not possess. Thus idea in its original form
is seen to be, not a concept of reelity propagated by it
in mind 1 but·' on the contrary 1 it is found to be the
eternal mold into which reality is cast. The universe of
real things is made after the image or pattern of the
invisible things--eternal ideas. It is that which makes
the universe intelligible, or translatable into thought.
The unmeaning cannot be explained. That which does not
express thought cannot be put in the terms of thought.l 7
This primacy of the idea is not Platonic because it has no
real being but is in the mind of God.
·Foster did not mean to say that the concept is
propagated in the perceiving mind by the external concrete,
or that the mind is a passive recipient of the image of the
reality, as is a mirror, but that the object when presented
to the mind in sensation becomes the occasion or ground of a
mental act by which is formed a concept of the reality.

The

archetypal idea to Foster was that which antedated the
concrete reality.

He explained again the order of ideas and

things.
The historic order is: first, an eternal mind, the one
only reality, holding in idea a universe not yet existing;
second, a creative act, by which a universe of objective,
concrete being was fs.shioned after the pattern of
antecedent ideas. Subsequent to that creative act there
were and are two kinds of being--one, the uncreated,
independent, which anterior to the creation was the only
being; the other, a created form of being, which, prior
to the creative act, had no existence except as a thought,
but which, by the creative act, became a reality and not

a thought; third, created mind--a real being or beings
introduced into existence long posterior to the creation
of things, which, by a ppwer invested in them, is able to
see the antecedent things a.s they are in reality--things
expressing ideas. The three kinds of being are distinct
and real, and separable in thought: the first, eternal,
spiritual; the second, temporal, material; the third,
temporal, spiritual; the second and third dependent on
and caused by the first; the second in no sense dependent
on or caused by the third; the third not caused by the
second but served by it; the first and the third of the
same nature, but different as infinite and finite; the
second wholly differentiable in nature from the first and
third. In the first, idea is archetype; in the second,
idea is concrete; in the third, idea is derivative.l5
Knowledge distinguished

~

belief.

Locke's

definition of knowledge was brief 1 being the "perception of
the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy,
of any of our ideas."l9

This implied certainty.

According

to Foster, knowledge implies three things: (1) firm belief;
(2) of what is true (3) on sufficient grounds.20

The

pertinent part of the definition is the last phrase.

The

grounds, according to Locke, must be such as to give
certainty, not just assurance or probability.
certainty.

11

Intuition gives

All knowledge is in the last resort, intuition.tt21

The knowing process involves intuition.

Only intuition, which

immediately perceives the agreement or disagreement of ideas,
lS Ibid., p. 69.
19 Locke, QQ. cit., p. 424.
20 ~·~ p. 12S.
21 Ibid., pp. 434-36.
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yields knowledge.

However, according to Locke22 the process

of demonstrative proof yields knowledge because in each step
intuition is used so that the valid conclusions of such a
process yield certainty though of a slightly inferior quality
to simple intuition--as if there could be degrees of certainty!
Foster 1 s list of what is known squared with Locke 1 s
view--with one exception.
We know objects external to self by perception when in
suitable relations to them [falling under category of
sensitive knowledge of particular existence in Locke 8 s
wording].
We know things and events of the past by memory
[retention of what has been known].
We know things and events by testimony [this to Locke
constituted probability and not knowledge except in the
case of the testimony of a Divine personality. Very
substantial testimony brings such high probability as to
excite a high degree of assurance].
We know some necessary truths (axiomatic truths].
We know demonstrated truths.23
Locke made a remarkable admission in favor of Divine
Revelation because he regarded the testimony of a Divine
Being as constituting the highest type of knowledge.
Besides those we have hitherto mentioned, there is one
sort of propositions that challenge the highest degree of
our assent, upon bare testimony, whether the thing
proposed agree or disagree with the common experience and
the ordinary course of things or no. The reason where of
is, because the testimony is of such an one that cannot
deceive nor be deceived, and that is of God himself.
22 Foster,~· cit., p. 69.

23 Ibid., p. 182.

This carries with it assurance beyond doubt, evidence
beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name
1 revelation, 11 and our assent to it, 1 faith 1 ; which as
absolutely determines our minds and as perfectly excludes
all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well
doubt of our own being as we can whether any revelation
from God be true. So that faith is a settled and sure
principle of assent and assurance, end leaves no manner
of room for doubt or hesitation. Only we must be sure that
it be a divine revelation, and that we understand it right:
else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of
enthusiasm and all the error of wrong principles, if we
have faith and assurance in what is not divine revelation.
And therefore, in those cases, our assent can be
rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a
revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on
probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an
assurance of diffidence, arising from the more or less
apparent probability of the proofs. But of faith and the
precedency it ought to have before other arguments of
persuasion 1 I shall speak more hereafter, where I tree.t
of it as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to
reason, though, in truth, it be nothi~ij else but an
assent founded on the highest reason.
Foster, in the many pages which he devoted to the
subject, said no more than what Locke thus said so concisely
and so well.
How shall we determine which of our concepts are
knowledge, which beliefs, and which mere unfounded fancies?
This was a leading question to Foster.

The problem of the

relation of belief to knowledge occupied a large a.'llare of
the concern of the Prolegomena.

There are certain common

points belonging to all of the three--knowledge, belief, and
fancy.

They all alike imply the presence in the mind of

defined conceptions.
2~ Locke, SQ·

They' all imply a degree of conviction

£11., p. 566.
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that the concept represents some truth, expresses an
affirming act or state of the mind with respect to the
concept, or the object which it represents.25

Here Foster

follows Locke in regarding knowledge as involving certainty.
Wnere there is certain knowledge there is no need for belief.
Belief and fancy involve uncertainty.

Mere feeling of

certainty alone is not sufficient ground for discriminating
knowledge from belief.

When knowledge of a thing is affirmed

there is no possibility that this knowledge should turn out
to be false.

A belief may not square with the truth but

knowledge must or it no longer is knowledge.
Foster regarded a clear understanding of the relation
of belief to knowledge to be of prime importance to theology.
Belief without antecedent knowledge is blind credulity.
Belief must rest upon a foundation of knowledge.

In the work

of theologians like Charles Hodge this distinction between
belief and knowledge is not made too clearly.
Knowledge is the perception of truth. Whatever the
mind perceives, whether intuitively or discursively, to
be true, that it knows. We have immediate knowledge of all
the facts of consciousness; and with regard to other
matters, some we can demonstrate, some we can prove
analogically, some we must admit or involve ourselves in
contradictions and absurdities. Whatever process the
mind may institute, if it arrives at a clear perception
that a thing is, then that thing is an object of
knowledge. It is thus that we know the objects with which
heaven and earth are crowded. It is thus we know our
fellow men. With regard to anything without us, when our
ideas or convictions concerning it correspond to what the
25 P"o st er, .2l2.· ill· , p. 71+.

20

thing really is then we know it. How do we know that our
dearest friend has a soul, and that that soul has
intelligence, moral excellence, and power? We cannot see
or feel it. We cannot form a mental image of it. It is
mysterious and incomprehensible, yet we know that it is,
and what it is, just as certainly as we know that we
ourselves are, and what we are. In the same way we know
tbat God is, and what he is. We know that he is a spirit,
that he has intelligence, moral excellence and power to
an infinite degree. We know that he can love, pity, and
pardon--that he can hear and answer prayer. We know God
in the same sense, and just as certainlyJ as we knot'V' our
father and mother. And no man can take this knowledge
from us, or persuade us that it is not knowledge, but a
mere irrational belief.2°
Foster remarked after quoting the above statement from
Hodge that he thought it was open to serious objections.
However, he did not give his objections specifically but
continued to differentiate between the acts of knowing and
believing.

He listed the following differences.

(1) It is

not in the fact that the object is more clearly before the
mind in the one case than in the other.

There is no doubt

that matters of belief are genera.lly more indistinct thEm
matters of knowledge; but this is not necessarily so.
proposition may be as unequivocal as any reality.

A

(2) It is

not in the fact that the mind is more conscious of doubt or
uncertainty in the one case than in the other.

There is no

question that doubt and uncertainty more or less attaches to
beliefs, and that they neither can nor do exist in regard to
knowledge; but a belief may and often does exclude all doubt.

(3) It is not in the fact that what is

26 It>id., PP· 7S-79·

kno~m

is true, and
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what is believed is not true.

It is a fact that what is

believed is not always true, and what is known always is, but,
since some things believed are true, the difference is not in
that which may be, and sometimes is, common to both states.

(4) It does not consist in that; what is known is important,
and what is believed is not important.
The difference is found in the following points.
(1) The mind is differently related to the objects of
knowledge and belief.

This difference of relation makes

knowledge a necessary fact in one case and not in another.
(2) Things known are necessarily true as known; things
believed may not be true.

(3) Things known may not be

doubted; things believed may be brought to doubt.

(4) Knowledge cannot be changed into belief; belief may pass
into knowledge.

(5) There is no difference in the certainty

which attends knowledge; there is difference in the certainty
which attends belief. 27
In comparing the statement of Hodge with the
distinctions made by Foster and checking both by Locke it has
been, in some degree, possible to ascertain how clearly
Foster was able to distinguish between the acts of knowing
and believing.

The whole business of knowledge and belief is

more complicated than differentiating between the terms of
knowledge and belief.

As Foster said, any child knows the

27 Ibid., pp. 80-Sl.
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difference between believing and knowing.

This, however, has

reference only to the difference between the terms.
Foster had no quarrel with what was affirmed by Hodge,
but he did take issue with the manner in which it was
asserted.

A clear perception of truth is knowledge; there is

no argument here but the great burden of the problem of
knowledge is how it can be established that what is perceived
does correspond with reality.

Clarity, of perception, as

Locke pointed outfg is not determined by the intensity of
feeling associated with the conviction.

The entire realm of

beliefs, whether of natural things or what is supernaturally
revealed, must undergo a thoroughly rational test.

Nothing

must be believed that does not carry with it credentials
giving reason for such a belief.

When credentials associated

with beliefs are so strong as to remove all doubt knowledge
has been reached.
The relation

2!

reason 12 revelation.

The problem of

the relation of reason to revelation until recently was quite
a settled problem in theology, almost as settled as the
doctrine of the Trinity.

However, in recent years, due to

the great dust stirred up by the dialectical theologians, it
has again become a pertinent issue of discussion.

This is an

instance not of a healthy ferment, preceding growth in a
2g Locke, QR•

£!!., p. 591.
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field of knowledge 1 but is rather a sign revealing the decay
existing in a large strata of contemporary philosophy.
On the relation of reason to revelation Hodge and
Foster saw eye to eye.
the subject.29

Hodge wrote clearly and forcibly upon

He admonished that Christians in repudiating

rationalism in all its forms do not throw out reason in
matters of religion.

~ney

acknowledge its high place and the

responsibility falling upon them to use it.

First of all

reason is necessarily presupposed in every revelation.
Revelation is a communication of truth to the human mind.
The notion of communication of truth supposes the capacity to
receive it.

Revelation has nothing to communicate to brutes.

Truths, to be received as objects of faith, must be
intellectually apprehended.

A proposition with no meaning, no

matter how important the truth which it may conceal, cannot
be an object of faith.

If it be affirmed that the soul is

immortal, or that God is a spirit, unless we grasp the meaning
of the terms nothing is communicated to the mind.
is essential to faith.
is not known.

Knowledge

Nothing can be affirmed of that which

The first task of reason is to grasp the

truths proposed for our reception.
To Hodge it was important to bear in mind the
difference between knowing and understanding.

A child can

know that God is a spirit, know what the terms imply but no
29 Foster, QQ.

£11.,

pp. 264 ff.

created mind can fully comprehend the Almighty.

It is

possible to know the plan of salvation but at the same time
be unable to comprehend the mysteries involved.
men know much more than they understand.

Generally

God does not require

of His creatures that they believe without knowledge.

Such a

thing would not only be irrational but also impossible.
It is the prerogative of reason to judge of the
credibility of revelation.

However, what is creditable to

one mind may be incredible to another.

To judge too narrowly

of what is credible is intellectual suicide.

Unless one is

willing to believe things that are incomprehensible one 1 s
beliefs will be so limited as to restrict their mind to
darkness.

Extreme skepticism drives out knowledge completely.

All that is left for the mind is to posit its beliefs and for
these beliefs there is no objective standard by which they may
be judged.
There is a difference between what is incomprehensible
and what is impossible.
as a true belief.

The impossible cannot be maintained

The statement of Tertullian to the effect

that he believed because it is absurd is nonsense.

God no

more requires men to believe what is absurd than to do what
is wrong.

There is a distinction between belief and faith.

Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is
true.

It is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm

that to be true which it sees cannot possibly be true.

As it

25
is impossible for God to contradict Himself, so it is impossible
that He should, by an external revelation, declare that to be
true which from a law of nature He has rendered it impossible
for men to believe.
Scripture itself appeals to reason.
faith and knowledge is confidence in God.

The high ground of
With the denial of

reason would disappear all distinction between truth and
falsehood, between right and wrong.
The cardinal service of reason is as a judge of the
evidences which support a revelation.
is irrational.

Faith without evidence

Evidences consist in different varieties.

Historical truth requires historical evidence; empirical
truth, the testimony of experience; mathematical truth,
demonstration; moral truth, moral evidence; a.nd the things of
the Spirit, the demonstration of the Spirit.
To Foster the approach to revelation was thoroughly
rational.
The final and supreme arbiter in every case as to what
is truth, is the mind itself. It may mistake, but it must
abide its own verdicts. It is its function to decide for
itself. The ground of the decision, when it acts truly,
according to its nature, must be satisfactory evidence.
It can never be required to act otherwise. It is sole
and supreme umpire. It must decide what to accept and
what to reject. It is responsible for the decision.
There may be a case when it cannot decide which of
several alternatives ought to be believed--that is which
is true. There may be sufficient evidence in its
possession, and none within its reach by any search
possible to it. In that case it remains undecided. Thus
it appears that while it may 1 by the right use of the
faculties, conclude from evidence what should be believed
or not believed in a given case, and while it is itself

alone responsible in that case for its decision, there
are cases which do not come within range of its faculties,
with respect to which it has no power except by self abuse
to have any belief, and with respect to which 1 therefore 1
it has a responsibility to withhold fa,ith. Non-faith is
then its true attitude; not disbelief nor yet belief.30
The reason decides on the evidences.

The mind is

obliged to believe just what the evidences prove.

Further

the mind is obliged to actively pursue truth, to hunt
evidences in order to reach a just conclusion.

The mind must

know what constitutes evidence.31
Not only is the reason employed in dealing \<lith
evidences but also it is used in determining the meaning of
the contents of Scripture.
Biblical interpretation.

Foster posited two rules for
(1) No idea can be contained which

is not according to truth, and hence, that no idea can be
contained which is contradictory of some known truth, or
which is contradictory in itself.

(2) Ideas cannot be found

in the book which are subversive and contradictory of each
other.32
The reason maintains the right to judge whether a
passage in Scripture is authentic or not.

If there should be

an absolute conflict between reason and any purported
revelation the verdict of reason is supreme.
30 Ibid., p. 269.
31 Loc. ill·
32 ~-

1
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Inspiration of the .§criptures.

Foster held very

liberal views regarding the inspiration of the Scriptures.
To him the Bible need not be inspired in all its parts.

To

claim inspiration for the whole Bible was to make a needless
assertion.
true.

All that is needed is to claim that the Bible is

Untruth is the only thing which could put it in peril.

The fact that Christ and the other New Testament writers
recognized the authority of the Old Testament need not mean
that they considered it as all inspired but simply that they
regarded it e"s all true.

Foster made his o\>m peculiar

distinctions between revelation and inspiration.

The Bible,

to him, was a revelation insofar as it is a self-manifestation
of God, or a medium of God 1 s disclosure of himself.
Inspiration to Foster v.Jas an extraordinary influence exerted
by the Spirit of God on the mind of the writer so that
feelings and thoughts were directly imparted.

To Foster

there might be the possibility of other methods of revelation
besides inspiration.

Revelation has many incidents.

creation was a revelation.

The

Likewise, the order of nature, the

incarnation of the deity in human form, the miracles, the
Bible itself are all revelations.

The Bible could be a

revelation without being inspired.
Let us look at the case in a common-sense way, and see
what conclusion must force itself upon us either as
necessary or the most rational. Here is a book of so many
pages, words, letters, and punctuation points. By all it
is conceded that it was written by a certain number of
men at different periods of time; but a question is

started as to whether the men wrote as amanuenses or
original authors. Now, if the book is true, it can, in
fact, make no difference as to its intrinsic value how
that question is answered since the answer one way or
another can put nothing in the book that was not there
before and can make the truth no more than true--no more
important. Still, as a question of fact, it remains,
were the writers amanuenses? How shall we answer that
question? Ha.ve they said anything about it themselves?
Does the book contain the answer? If the book be simply
true, and if it makes a deliverance on the point, that
would settle the case. Everything would turn on the
question of the truthfulness of the book. Thus the
question of truth of contents is again the question of
ultimate importance. There are three v 1ews competing for
acceptance, one of which must be true. 33
This quotation has served as a basis for judging
Foster• s position on the inspiration of the Scriptures.

The

three views which he referred to were: (1) the plenary verbal
view--each word was given to the writers from God; (2) the
superintendence view--the Holy Spirit guided the writers in
the selection and insured against error; (3) the view that
the writings were to a large extent human recor4s containing
a truthful account, with many inspired portions delivered
directly to the holy men.34 This last view corresponded with
Foster's notion of inspiration.
It has been impossible in this study to determine how
Foster derived such a liberal view of the inspira.tion of the
Scriptures.

In a quotation used in this study, Foster wrote

that the Word itself said nothing about whether or not the

33

Ibid.

I

pp. 2gl-g2.

34 Ibid., p. 2g2.
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writers were amanuenses.

The Bible said nothing whatever

about the mode of inspiration, it simply stated that

11

all

Scripture is given by inspiration of God.n35 Peter referred
to the holy men of God who spoke as they were moved by the
Holy Ghost.36

There are other simple references in the Bible,

such as in the book of Revelation,37 where the writers were
commanded to write.

The Holy Spirit communed directly with

the writers to command them to write and to instruct them in
what to write.3g

There are several references in the Bible

to the Divine origin of the Scriptures.39

The hundred and

nineteenth Psalm alone is full of references to the Word, the
statutes of God, and the law of God.

Though nothing has been

given in the Bible concerning the mode of inspiration it is
full of references to the Word of God as being sacred, as
being inspired of God in its entirety.
sacred and composes a unit
designated the Holy Bible.

~1ich

All of Scripture is

in all translations has been

It is not only all true but all of

it has been put together under the guidance of the Holy Spirit
~.

English. 1611. Authorized., The Hol~ Bible
(New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons ~n.d. 3 ), II Timothy 3:1 •
36 A.V., II Peter 1:21.
37 A.V., Revelation 1:11; Jeremiah 30:1.
3g A.V., Acts 1:16; Hebrews 3:7; Luke 16:31; Romans 3:2;
Hebrel*lS 1:1.
39 A. V.

1

Psalms 119:9.
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for a special purpose.4o

It is impossible to be acquainted

with the Bible and not be profoundly impressed by this work
of the Holy Spirit.

One has only to read the Apocryphal books

to realize that nothing but Divinely inbreathed literature
can hold its place between the covers of the Holy Bible.
What is only human cannot even guarantee that it is a hundred
percent true.

Truth involves not only an accurate account of

statistics but also accurate judgments.

The only explanation

that can be made for Foster 1 s liberal view of the inspiration
of the Scriptures is that he chose a purely rational approach.
Even so it is difficult to see how reason could arrive at such
a conclusion.

According to reason it would not be necessary

for any portion of the Bible to be inspired if it were all
true.
The Holy Spirit could have communed with the Holy men
of God, the ten commandments could have been given, Moses
could have delivered his addresses, the covenant could have
been made with Abraham, Christ could have come, died and been
raised from the dead, and all these things could have been
truthfully recorded by contemporary witnesses.

However,

without the complete superintendence of the Holy Spirit they
could never have composed the present unit.

The liberal view

of Foster stands without defense.
Miley accepted the fact of the agency of the Holy
~0 A:~

II Timothy 3:16.
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Spirit in the authorship of the Scriptures..

Rather than a.

rational approach to the subject he took the approach of what
Scripture says about itself.
inspiration and revelation.

Miley distinguished between
Inspiration was to him

11

a mode

of divine agency in the communication of religious truth, and
that such truth is the product of the inspiration.n41

On

revelation Miley wrote:
Now, if we restrict revelation to the literal sense of
the term, that is, a disclosure of unknown truths, and as
here meaning such truths of religion as we receive only
through the Scriptures, the same distinction between
inspiration and revelation fully remains; and such is the
only true distinction. But there may be a revelation
through some other mode of the divine agency, as for
instance the oral teaching of our Lord; and in such case
there must be the sa~e distinc4~on between such agency
and revelation as the product.
Miley differentiated a three-fold operation of the
Spirit: (1) Illumination of the mediate agent; (2) Communication
of the truth;

(3) Agency in publication. 43 In the illumination

of the agent the operation is similar to 't<Ihen Christ opened
the mind of his disciples so that they could understand the
Scriptures.

In the communication of truth the Holy Spirit

directly communicates truths to the agent.

The third, the

agency in the publication, is itself concerned with the proper
~Miley,

Systemati£ Theology, Vol. 2 (George R.
Crooks and John F. Hurst, editors, LibrarJ[ of Biblical an£
Theolo~ical Literature, 9 vols.; New York: Eaton and Mains,
H~7S-l 99} I p. lf"19-:- ·-

42 Loc. ill·

43 Ib!£· I pp. 4gl-g2.
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expression of the truth.
agencies required.

Not in all Scripture were all three

While there is a place for inspiration in

all Scripture, the threefold offices of the Spirit were
necessary only with respect to their higher truths.

CHAPTER III
ANTHROPOLOGY
I.

THE DOCTRINE OF NATIVE DEPRAVITY

a doctrinal formula for the expression and characterization
of native sinfulness.

The doctrine of original sin became a

prominent subject with Augustine though it was a topic of
theological study prior to his time.l

In the Augustinian

anthropology, original sin included a common guilt of Adam 1 s
sin, a common native depravity, and a. sinfulness which
deserved both temporal and eternal

punis~~ent.

According to

Augustinian anthropology native depravity is, in itself, a
punishment inflicted upon all men for their share in Adam's
guilt.

Miley felt that there was no necessity in treating

native depravity, guilt, demerit, and penalty as all one
problem but that they should be segregated and studied
separately. 2
Definition of

1~

used.

Depravity is not a physical

entity or any form of essential existence but is a moral
condition.

In its purely metaphysical form it is not easily

- - 1 John Miley, S;y:stematic .TI.!.~~~g;y:, Vol. l (George R.
Crooks and John F. Hurst 1 editors, Libra.:tl .Q1 Biblical and
Theological Literature, 9 vols.; New York: Eaton and Mains,

1878:1899),

p:-~1.

2 Ibid.

I

p. 442.
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grasped in thought.3

Depravity has no real being but it is a

mode of the moral nature which belongs to real being.
Depravity is not restricted to the will though the will is
profoundly affected, not only directly but also indirectly,
through the depraved sensibilities which influence the will.
Inordinate feelings, vicious impulses, evil tendencies arise
from a disordered state of the sensuous nature.

These are

the "lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the
pride of life.n

The moral nature itself is disordered.

The

moral reason may become darkened and the conscience por.-ierless.
Depravity is located in both the sensuous and the moral
nature, constituting filthiness of both the flesh and the
spirit.
The modes of transmission.
never has been disputed by

The origin of depravity

ev~Smgelical

theologians.

By them

the sin of Adam is attributed as the originating cause of
depravity.

The law of Adamic origin has two theories:

(l) the theory of penal retribution; and (2} the theory of
genetic transmission of depravity.

The theory of penal

retribution has two modes, the realistic and the representative.
The origin of the realistic mode is to be found in Augustine.4
3 Miley, loc.

£11.

4 William G. T. Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine
{New York: Charles Scribner, 1863), II, p. 79.
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However, it was more clearly developed by Anselm.5

In its

final form, as it appears today, it is an umvarranted extension
of the forme of philosophical thought into anthropology.
According to moderate realism the universal essence exists in
the particular members of a species.

However, this universal

essence is not such a real spiritual and material substance as
is the individual human being.
with a person.6
guilty.

Guilt can only be associated

It is unreasonable to consider an essence

To Miley, the guilt of Adam 1 s sin was purely personal

to Adam and could no more become the guilt,of a generic nature
than any other non-personal being, such as the hand, could
become guilty of the crime committed by its owner.
The representative mode involves a legal oneness of the
race in Adam.

This legal oneness is based on the theory that

God instituted a covenant with Adam in which he became the
federal head and representative of his race and in which
capacity he sinned and thus the whole race became involved in
the guilt.7

This sharing of the guilt is not the result of

an actual sharing of the sin but becomes the possession of
Adam 1 s descendants by imputation.

Neither the act nor the

demerit of Adam 1 s sin is imputed, only the gull t as an
amenability to punishment is imputed by a judicial act of God.
5 Ibid., p. 118.
6 Miley,

.Qp_. _ill. '

p • 488.

7 Ibid., pp. 493-94.

The early Calvinistic theologians blurred the two modes into
one.

The1ater Calvinists, such as Charles Hodge, presented

very clearly defined views of the representative mode.

To

the arguments put forth in support of the representative
theory Miley could not consent.

These arguments were based

on the principle of responsibility from representation.
minister binds the state, the parent the child.
relations are providential relations.

The

Such

The relation of Adam

to his descendants is such a providential relation, and hence
the actions of Adam, in his capacity as a representative of
the race, became binding on the race.
could not be sustained.

To Miley these arguments

Neither guilt nor penalty is

involved in the situations purported to be analogous.

Before

the law the father may have some responsibilities for the son,
but under no circumstance is guilt imputed to the one or the
other because of the deed of one.

Civil law does not

recognize such imputation.g
To Miley both the realistic and the representative
modes came short of being established by sufficient proof.
The Biblical references put forth to establish the unity of
guilt, to him, did not clearly indicate such validity of
interpretation.

Hodge9 had used such Scripture references.

··

g 'Charles Hodge Systemati.£. Theology (New York:
Charles Scribner, 1g71~, II, PP• 337-38.
9 Ibid.

I

pp. lg9, 5g2.
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Miley regarded the suffering of the children of criminals to
be consequence e~d not penalty.lO

It would be impossible for

God to restrict consequences to personal demerit.
society is too involved.

Human

It was for corrective ends, as a

severe wa.rning to people to abstEtin from sin because of its
drastic consequences, that God so ordered the suffering of
innocents.
The classical text in anthropology is that God

11

will

by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the
fathers upon the children, and upon the children 1 s children,
unto the third and fourth generation.nll

Wesley had

interpreted this text to refer especially to the sin of
idolatry.

Very drastic measures were required to restrain

the people from idolatry.
II.

Afu~INIAN

TREATMENT OF ORIGINAL SIN

So important to Miley was the problem of clearing up
the inconsistencies of Arminian anthropology that he gave a
second treatment of the subject in the appendix to the second
volume of his main theological work.

In this study Miley

surveyed briefly, but pertinently, the views held by the older
Arminians on the topic of gull t associated t-Ii th native
depravity.
10 Miley, QQ. cit., p. 497·
11 Ibid.> p. 49g.

According to Arminius, the whole of the original sin
is common to the entire race who at the time of Adam's
transgression were in his loins.

He referred to Romans 5:12

as conclusive that all have sinned in Adam.
to Ephesians 2:3, where all men

11

Also he referred

are by nature the children

of wrath 11 and are subject to temporal as well as eternal
death.

This guilt would remain upon all unless they were

redeemed by Christ 1 s atonement.

According to this view, all

men are sharers in the guilt of Adam 8 s personal sin, and this
guilt is the judicial ground not only of the corruption of
nature or spiritual death in which we are born, but also of
our native amenability to the penalty of temporal and eternal
death. 1 2 Arminius regarded the native depra.vity which
entailed spiritual, temporal, and eternal death, as being in
itself a penalty and thus not requiring that it entail
demerit..

Arminius, in regarding the race as existing in the

loins of Adem, adhered to the realistic mode of the
transmission of native depravity.
Wesley adhered essentially to the same views on
original sin as Arminius.

He regarded

punished for the sin of Adam by death.

e~l

men as being

He argued from this

premise: that if all men were punished by God they were justly
punished, and if they were justly punished they shared in
Adam 1 s sin.

Miley was satisfied that Wesley believed that all

12 Miley, Systematic Theology, Vol. 2, p.

505.
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men shared in Adam 1 s guilt and are justly amenable to its
punishment. 1 3
Fletcher 1vas in accord with Armin ius and Wesley on
this subject.

He held to the doctrine of the common guilt of

the race through Adam.

This judgment Miley derived from the

place which Fletcher gave to the atonement of Christ as
taking away the guilt of native depravity.
atonement is universal.

The grace of the

Fletcher expressed it thus:

It follows that as Adam brought a general condemnation
and a universal seed of death upon all infants, so Christ
brings upon them a general justification and a universal
seed of life. And if Adam's original sin was atoned for
and forgiven him, as the Calvinists, I think, generally
grant, does it not follow that, although all infants are
by nature children of wrath, yet through the redemption
of Christ they are in a state of favor or justification?
For how could God damn to all eternity any of Adam's
children for a sin which Christ expiated--a sin which was
forgiven almost six thousand years ago to Adam, who
committed it in person? The force of this observation
would strike our Calvinist brethren if they considered
that we were not less in Adam 1 s loins TFJhen God gave his
Son to Adam in the grand, original gospel promise, than
i'Jhen Eve prevailed on him to eat of the forbidden fruit •
• • • Thus, if we all received an unspeakable injury by
being seminally in Adam when he fell, according to the
first covenant, we all received also an unspeakable
blessing by being in his loins when God s£¢ritually raised
him up and placed him upon gospel ground.
Watson, who to Miley represented the most honored name
among systematic theologians,
Calvinism on this same point.

a~so

conceded the ground to

He regarded the human race as

such a unit that all men were involved in the guil-t of Adam 1 s

13 Ibid.

I

p.

506.

14 Ibid., p. 507.

original sin.

Watson expressed it as follows:

The circumstances of the case infallibly show that, in
the whole transaction, they (Adam and Evel stood before
their Maker as public persons and as the legal
representatives of their descendants, though if so many
words they are not invested with these titles. 5
To Watson the guilt of sin and amenability to
punishment we,s imputed to Adam 1 s descendants.

\'lat son 1 s theory

of imputation coincided almost exactly with the view held on
the same subject by Calvinist theologians contemporary with
Miley.
Pope, another English Methodist theologian, contemporary
with Miley, adhered to a common hereditary guilt.
three grounds on which he based this guilt: (1) the

He had
g~ound

of

a real oneness with Adam; (2) the ground of a representative
oneness; and (3) the ground of intrinsic sinfulness of the
depravity of nature inherited from Adam. 1 6 According to
Miley, these views could neither be reconciled with each other
nor with the determining principles of Arminianism. 1 7 As
noted before in this study the first two modes of transmission
of guilt ccncel each other.
Summers rejected both the realistic mode and the
representative mode but he found no real solution to the
problem for he made the transmission of guilt one of imputation.

---r-5 ibid.

1

P• 50go

16 Ibid., pp. 50g-09.
17 Ibid.) p. 511.
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Thus 1 in the list of Arminian theologians which he brought to
his study, Miley found in none of them a solution to the
problem.

They all had conceded ground to Calvinism.

Miley

saw clearly that if universal gull t could be established for
the original sin of Adam then God is justified in sending all
men to perdition.

If God chooses to exempt some men from

this fate he may do so with justice.

Good gifts may be

dispensed with at ltlill according to the pleasure of the giver.
Penalty may only be dispensed with according to guilt in the
person to whom it is given.

These principles are universally

recognized as basic to the laws of crime and punishment.
Miley recognized clearly that if the Arminian
soteriology was to have a solid basis it must clarify its
anthropology.

The traditional anthropology of Augustine did

not match the soteriology developed by Arminius, Grotius,
Wesley, and Watson.
Miley in rejecting any sort of transmission or
imputation of the guilt of AdeE to his descendants clarified
and made consistent Arminian anthropology and cleared it of
all concessions to the Calvinistic system.

This rectified

anthropology matches the conclusions of traditional Arminian
soteriology.

Though the evaluation of Miley's contribution

to Arminian theology has been reserved for the concluding
chapter: it has been pertinent to note here that this
accomplishment of Miley, in clarifying Arminian anthropology,

has been a unique and very significant contribution to
Wesleyan-Arminian theology.

CHAPTER IV
SOTERIOLOGY
I.

THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT
background.

Histori~l

The development of systematic

soteriology was a late development in the history of doctrine.
Though Augustinel had developed a systematic ~thropology his
notions of the atonement were crude.
notion tha t the

He accepted the odd

atonement is a payment made by God to Satan.

Anselm living in the eleventh century was the first systematic
soteriolo gist.

The earliest treatment of the atonement had

consisted of Scriptural statements vlithout any attempt at
doctrinal formation.

The early doctrines which were developed

were so crude, false, and inadequate that nothing could be
developed from them.

In the history of doctrine Anselm st ands,

in relation to soteriology, in the position in which Augustine
stands to anthropology. Anselm 2 formulated the doctrine of
the atonement which became accept able to the theologies of the
Reforma tion.

He formulated what to him were basic principles

from which a theory of the atonement could be constructed.
These principles were: (1) sin is the withholding from God
His rightful claim, and therefore is to Him, on account of
1 Shedd, Histor~ of Christian Doctrine, II, pp .
2 Ibid., p.

275.

253-54.
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His character, an infinite wrong.

(2) The sinner is thus

brought to an infinite indebtedness to the Divine honor; (3)
this debt must be paid.

(4) God must not and cannot surrender

his own personal honor, as he would do in a mere gratuitous
forgiveness.

(5) The sinner never can, by any personal

conduct, satisfy this claim; (6) therefore, he must suffer
the full punishment of his sins, or, as the only alternative,
satisfaction must be rendered by another.

(7) It follows

that the only salvation is through the compensating service
of a divine mediator.

(8) In this exigency the Son of God,

in compassion for perishing sinners, was incarna ted in their
nature and on their behalf gave himself up in holy obedience
and suffering to the Father.

Because of his theanthropic

cliaracter his obedience and death are in full compensation to
the violated honor of God, and therefore, a true and
sufficient ground of forgiveness.3

Upon the principles of

Anselm the theory of satisfaction has been developed.
William G. T. Shedd~ in his history of doctrine, regarded
Anselm as a man born out of his time, for he belongs, in his
thinking, with the Reformation group.

The theologians who

appeared le.t er, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries fell
short of Anselm in their soteriology.

The doctrines of such

eminent scholastics as Scotus and Aquinas came far short of an
3 Miley, S1stematic Theo1Qgl 1 Vol. 2, pp . 108-09.

4 Shedd, QQ. cit., p. 273.

evangelical development in their treatment of the doctrine of
sot eriology.
Though Anselm has been regarded by the Calvinists as
having originated the theory of satisfaction, strictly speaking
his theory of the atonement was not the satisfaction theory
as held by the Calvinists.

The substitutive office of the

active obedience of Christ was not in his doctrine.5
discriminated between punishment and satisfaction.

Anselm
To Miley6

the doctrine of atonement, as developed by Anselm, was very
different from the doctrine of satisfaction.

Miley regarded

only two theories of the atonement as worthy of detailed study.
He gave the bulk of his attention to the satisfaction and the
governmental theories.
The satisfaction theory of the atonement.

Miley was

careful to delineate the development of the satisfaction
theory of atonement as a conscious effort to make it fit a
workable doctrine, able to fit the needs of the Calvinistic
system.

This system required a finished salvation in Christ.

As man's sins were imputed to Christ so Christ 1 s obedience
could be imputed to man.

With the Calvinists there are two

factors in the atonement: (1} substituted punishment; and (2)
substituted obedience.

As man could not atone for his own

5 Miley, ..Q.R• .£.1.1., p. lOS.
6 Ibid.

I

pp. lOS-09.
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sins but required a more potent substitute so also he is
unable to fulfill the requirement of obedience.
of Christ his substitute is imputed to him.
atonement of satisfaction.

The obedience

This is the

Christ took the place of the elect

in both penalty and precept, and as their substitute, endured
the punishment which, on account of sin, they deserve, and in
his obedience satisfied the righteousness required of them.
So justice and law are satisfied.

The vicarious punishment

dismissed the elect from the amenability to penalty on account
of their sin, and Christ's vicarious obedience made them
deservably rewardable with the eternal blessedness to which
they have been predestined.7
Though the core of the satisfaction theory is the
satisfaction in the punishment of sin according to its merit,
and solely for that reason, there are also included incidental
aspects of the theory such as the moral influence exerted and
the governing rectoral office.

The principle fact however is

that Christ takes the place of elect sinners before the law,
and suffers in their place the penalty of which they are
guilty and which suffering satisfies the demands of punitive
justice.
Miley considered three forms of substitution: (1) in
identical penalty; (2) in equal penalty; (3) in ·equivalent
penalty.

The first form has been largely discarded by

7 Ibid. ,

p. 134.

Calvinist theologians.

Its difficulties were too numerous

for it to long command serious consideration.

The main

difficulty was that it was psychologically impossible.

How

could the sufferings of a finite being, enduring for eternity,
be made identical \<Tith the sufferings of Christ for a short
duration.
The second form in equal penalty has also been largely
discarded.

It equated the sufferings of Christ with all the

sufferings the redeemed would have endured.

Miley regarded

it too low an opinion to merit consideration.
The last form is the one which has gained recognition
and acceptance.

It holds that the superior rank of Christ,

as substitute in penalty, is sufficient to pay the penalty of
all men 1 s sins.

The

Ca~vinists

in using this form would

restrict it to include only the sins of the elect.
Miley pointed out that atonement by substitution was
not a basic part of the sati sfa.ct ion theory alone, but that it
was also a basic part of the governmental theory.

There are

many besides Calvinists l!fho hold that such a penal substitution
constitutes a really conditional ground of forgiveness.

To

this group the redemptive sufferings were the punishment of
sin, but not such a punishment that the redeemed sinner must
in very justice be discharged.
Penal substitution ano_ a real conditiona.lity of
forgiveness must refuse scientific fellowship. We accept,
therefore the view of Dr. A. A. Hodge, that it is 1by a
happy sacrifice of logic 1 that Arminius himself, and some

of his leading followers e.re with the Calvinists on penal
substitution; only we reject the epithet qualifying the
sacrifice. We do not think it a happy sacrifice of logic
on the part of an Arminian 1 whereby he mistakes the true
nature of the atonement, and at the same time admits a
principle that requires him, in consistency, to accept
along with it the purely distinctive doctrines of
Calvinism. But whatever the sacrifice of logic in the
case, the fact of such a theory re..lllains the same, and this
fact denies to the doctrine of satisfacjion the
distinctive fact of penal substitution.
An absolute penal substitution remains the unique
possession of Calvinism.

This absolute penal substitution

gives to all for whom it is a substitute an unconditional
discharge of penalty for sin.
Miley posited four chief principles for the theory of
satisfaction: (1} the demerit of sin; (2) a divine punitive
justice; (3) sin ought to be punished; and (4) penal
satisfaction is a necessity of justice.

The first two

principles Miley readily accepted as consistent with a strict
satisfaction theory.

The last two principles, to Miley,

could not be held by a strict satisfaction theory but burst
open the way into the governmental theory.

God, of necessity,

as a. moral ruler must punish sin by direct punishment or by
accepting

~m

appropriate substitute for the sinner.

In the

strict bounds of the satisfaction theory this obligation to
punish must be maintained simply on the ground of the demerit
of sin.

This, to Miley, was untenable and burst the bounds of

the satisfaction theory, giving way to the governmental theory.
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From the nature of injustice the punishment of sin is
necessary. The obligation is such that any omission of
punishment would be an act of injustice. Thus from the
very nature of divine justice, the necessary punishment
of sin is deduced as a consequence. It is as essential
and immutable in God as any other attribute; therefore he
must punish sin according to its desert and upon that
ground. Thus his justice binds him to the infliction of
merited punishment upon sin, just as other moral
perfections bind him to holiness, goodness, and truth.9
To Miley it was because the punishment of sin is a
necessity in the rectitude of Divine justice that the only
possible atonement is by penal substitution.

A thorough-

going satisfaction theory could not allow for penal substitution.
Does the penal substitution maintained fulfill the alleged
absolute oblijation of justice to punish sin according to its
demerit?

There is no such answer or fulfillment.l 0

In going

on 't-lith his argument to support his position that the
satisfaction theory is inadequate, Miley contended that
nothing could be punished in Christ which was not transferred
to him, and in some real sense made his.
self-evident.

This to him was

If sin with its demerit could not be put upon

Christ by imputation, no punishment which he suffered fell
upon such demerit, or intrinsic evil of sin.

It is impossible

to show how sin is punished according to its demerit in the
total absence of such demerit from the substitute in
punishment.

With the omission of the theory, its only

143.
10 Ibid. , p. 145.
9 Ibid.

I

P·
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recourse is in guilt as a distinct fact of sin.

If guilt, as

the amenability of sin to the penalty of justice, is separable
from sin, and as a distinct fact transferable to Christ, and
if his punishment is the punishment of sin according to its
demerit and on that ground, then the penal substitution
maintained answers to the asserted absolute necessity for the
punishment of sin.

If any one of these suppositions fails
11
the theory, then the theory itself inevitably fails.
Thus,

Miley presented the crux of the matter.

He then pointed out

that guilt could not be separated from sin.

Sin is not an

impersonal something but is closely associated with a person.
The person, in the last analysis, is what is punishable.

To

fulfill the requirement of a strict satisfaction theory Christ
must be identified with all the guilt and demerit which the
sinner possesses.

It of necessity follows that Christ must

be deserving of punishment, an utterly repulsive thought.
The strict satisfaction theory ushers squarely into the
main tenets of Calvinism.

Miley referred to Charles Hodge

from whom he derived the following quotation.
If the claims of justice are satisfied they cannot be
again enforced. This is the analogy between the work of
Christ and the payment of a debt. The point of agreement
between the two cases is not the nature of the satisf a ction
rendered, but one aspect of the effect produced. In both
cases the persons for whom the satisfa ction is made are
certainly freed. Their exemption of deliverance is in both
cases, and equally in both, a matter of justice.l2
11 Ibid.

I

p. 146.

12 Hodge, Systematic Theology, II, p. 472.
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Dick, another Calvinist theologian , quoted by Miley,
took the same line of argument a s did Hodge, to the effect
that God would not punish sin twice, first in Christ and then
in the sinn er.l3

In quoting from several other Calvinist

theologians the chorus was strength ened to the effect that
for those for whom Christ died ther e could be no more
condemna.tion for sin a s the price had been paid once and for
all.
To Miley, this conclusion, which the satisfa ction
theory re a ches in Calvinism, wa s a logical consequence which
could have been predicted from the principles held on the
theory.

To him the reason for entering into the argument and

bringing into it the quotations from the Calvinist theologians
was to make the issue so clea r as to silence all cavil.
The government al theory of the atonement.

The

governmental theory gives room for the substitutional
a tonement, for conditionality of the atonement, and for
substitution in suffering.

To Miley the suffering s of Christ

were an atonement for sin by substitution, in the sense that
they were intentionally endured for sinners under the judicial
condemnation, and for the sake of the forgiveness.

The

Scriptures are plain on the conditionality of the forgiveness
of sin.

The placing of the substitution of Christ in
13 Miley, QQ· cit., p. 151.
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suffering 1 rather than in penalty, finished the break of
Miley 1 s soteriology with the satisfaction theory as developed
by the Calvinists.
The substitution, therefore, is in suffering, without
the penal element. This agrees with the nature of the
atonement as a moral support of justice in its rectoral
office, thus rendering forgiveness consistent with the
interest of moral government.l~
Miley contended that the vicarious sufferings of Christ
did not lose in value without the penal element.

It was the

same efficacious sacrifice manifesting the same love.
Yet without the penal element
Christ, we may attribute to them
arising out of their relation to
office, and find the explanation

in the suffering of
a peculiar depth and cast
sin in their redemptive
in the facts of psychology.l5

Hodge had urged that penal substitution is necessary,
not only for the satisfaction of justice, but also for
satisfying the demands of a guilty conscience, which mere
pardon can never appease.

Miley fully accepted the fact of a

deep sense of punitive demerit because of sin in an awakened
conscience, but to him relief to conscience comes in the
knowledge that one 1 s sins are forgiven.
The governmental theory, though it had its origin with
Grotius, became identified as the New England theory and as
the Edwardian theory, after the son of Jonathan Edwards who
contributed to its formation.
14 Ibid., p. 156.
15 Ibid., P• 157.

Though Watson dealt extensively
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with the governmental theory his discussion was mainly a
dispute with the Socinien heresy and with Calvinism.

With

the former he desired to establish the fact that there was an
atonement and with the latter he desired to prove the
universality of the atonement.

Watson, to :M iley, represented

the most worthy Arminian systematic theologian.

He aspired

therefore, if possible, to improve upon the work of Watson
for he know that the one who could do that 'tvould make a real
contribution to systematic theology.

Miley corrected Watson

on his anthropology, and he also found it necessary to correct
him on his soteriology.

Miley recognized the service l'rhich

Watson had given in refuting the Socinian heresy and in his
soteriological polemics with Calvinism, but, aside from this,
he did not regard \vat son 1 s t>Jork in soteriology as clear or as
contributing a great deal to Arminian theology.

Watson had

been greatly indebted to Grotius on this topic.

Grotius

though he had originated the governmental theory had not given
it a thorough, scientific treatment.

Grotius, who had started

out as a. Reformed theologian, in turning to the Arminian
theology, still maintained the Calvinistic approach to the
subject of the atonement.

Therefore, Grotius 1 treatment of

the governmental theory of the atonement did not receive full
development.

Watson, according to Miley, did no better by the

subject than Grotius himself.

This important subject was left

ifli thout _tho_rough scientific treatment until a man able enough

for the task appeared upon the scene.

The man recognizing

the problem and at the same time possessing the ability to
give it scientific treatment proved to be Miley himself.
Pope, Foster, and Ralston all failed to tackle the problem,
whether from failure to recognize it or from lack of ability
to solve it no one knows.

Th a t Miley early recognized the

import ance of t h e problem of soteriology is proved by the
fact that his first well-known work in theology was a work on
the atonement.

His systema tic theology was but an expansion

on this w·ork which went intact into his work on systematic
theology.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF ENTIRE SANCTIFICATION

Under the benefits of the a tonement only the topic of
entire sanctification has been treated in this study.

The

other topics were not eliminated because they were
unimportant, bu t because they wer e less pertinent to this
study.

This thesis, of necessity, has b een very limited in the

material h andled.

The top ics of justification, regeneration,

and assurance have reached a rela t ively large degree of
agreement among evangelical theologians.

The topic of

sanctification has been a theological storm center, and
therefore an important subject for consideration in this
study.

Did Foster and Miley add anything to the thought of

Wesley , Fletcher, and Watson?

The doctrine of entire
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sanctification was a specialty with John Wesley.
thorough consideration.

Fletcher and Watson

He gave it

follm~ed

closely

in the steps of \'lesley and used him as the supreme authority
on the subject.

The t h eologians in America were farther removed

from the personal influence of Wesley.

With an opportunity to

give the subject a more objective treatment did they contribute
anything to the material bequeathed to them by their
predecessors'?

Did they find errors and inconsistencies in the

doctrine?
To both Foster and Miley there was a problem concerning
the sin which remains after regeneration.
I find evidences of obscurity in all the writings about
it. The most eminent divines are not clear. They all
agree in the fact; but when they attempt to explain they
become confused. The difficulty is to make plain what
that sin is, from which Christian men are not free, which
remains in, or is found still cleaving to believers; how
to discriminate between the same sin tha t is removed in
regeneration and the se~e sin that remains. And it is
just around this point that revolves the whole question of
entire sanctification, both as to what it is and its
possibility. It has to do with that sin that remains.
It removes that remainder of sin.lb
The above quotation from Foster was seized upon by Miley, as
expressing his own problem in regard to the same question.
Though both Foster and Miley recognized the import 8.nce o-f this
problem they had different solutions for it.

Foster

differentiated between the sin removed in regeneration and
that removed in entire sanctification as actual sin entailing

i6 Randolph S. Foster, Christian Purit~ (New York: Eaton
and Mains, 1S97), p. 117.

guilt for the former and inherited depravity, not entailing
guilt, for the latter.

To Miley there v.Tas no such easy

solution.
Miley found the problem of the remaining sin defiant
to exact explanation.

He did not regard this remaining sin

as identical with native depravity, because regeneration
accomplished different results in the hearts of people.
The question of a remnant of depravity is not without
perplexity. As the na ture of depra vity as a whole is
difficult for thought, so tha t of a remnant not different
in kind from the whole is difficult. Consequently, t~~re
is perplexity in the notion of entire sanctification. r
Miley later continued:
However, as the truth of native depra vity is not
conditioned in a capacity in us fully to apprehend it, or
clearly interpret it in thought , so the truth of a remnant
of depravity after regeneration is not so conditioned. In
each case t h e inner state may b e known t h Dough its
activities, a s manifest in our consciousness . There is
another mode of information. By the observation of others,
as to their tempers, words, and acts, \ve gain an insight
into their inner nature, and may thus know its
characteristic tendencies, whether to the good or evil.lg
Though Scripture, according to Miley, does not make
explicit statements on the incompl eteness of regeneration yet
enough is given so that a sure basis can be found for . the
doctrine in Scripture.

Though experience testifies of

remaining sin yet Miley would not consider basing a doctrine
upon experience.

17

Experience to him should never be used as a

Miley, QQ. cit., p. 35g.

lg Ibid., p. 359·
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source of doctrine but only to confirm doctrine.
In regard to the mode of the inner work of sanctification
Miley did not believe that perfect clarity was possible.

He

regarded Foster's work on the topic as clearly holding the
view of repression.

On examining the work of Foster at this

point, it has been impossible to agree with Miley on this
judgment.

Belo'tv is a quotation from Foster, taken from the

page marked, by Miley, as pertinent on this point.
It may be well to explain here, more particularly,
both with respect to the natural dispositions and
propensities. These are not supposed to be destroyed when
a soul is entirely freed from sin, but only brought under
right government and restored to a proper character--not
allowed to be instruments of sin. Evil dispositions and
propensitites are but perverted forms of good ones, and
hence, holiness or sanctification consists not in the
eradication of them, but in the restoration of them to
their legitimate character and use.l9
If the propensities and impulses are rectified what is
repressed?
That Miley regarded his own view, as well as Foster 1 s
and Whedon's, as favoring repression was unfortunate, because
it did not give as clear a final statement to the problem of
the mode of cleansing as it is possible to give.

Certainly

evil is no real being that may be cut out as a surgeon cuts
out a tumor or a cancer, neither is it something to be
repressed.

The human nature may be governed by pure motives,

pure desires.

What takes place in entire sanctification is

19 Foster, QQ. cit., p.

74.

the purification of motive and desire.

Neither the terms

eradication nor repression are suitable for explaining what
takes place.
On the possibility of holiness in this life, that is
a second work of grace, that the doctrine has a basis in
Scripture, and that it is obtainable by faith, Foster and
Miley were in agreement with the British theologians.

CHAPTER V
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION
I.

EVALUATION

Evaluation of Foster's contribution.

Foster made a

contribution to Wesleyan-Arminian t h eology in h is elaboration
of the philosophical basis to that theology.

Though he never

mentioned the name of Aristotle he lined his thinking s quarely
with the metaphy s ics of Aristotle.

\·lesley himself, though he

gave references to the importance of maintaining Aristotle's
logic, never worked out a philosophical basis to theology.
Watson cle arly presented the problem of causality in
relation to proving the existence of God. 1 He recognized the
power of the

~

posteriori proofs.

He also clearly showed how

Divine revel a tion had aided the human reason in arriving at a
first cause.

The tendency of the pagan mind had been to

regard matter a s eternal and thus involve an eternal
succession of causes and effects.

To Watson, the rational

proofs, by themselves, mi ght never have arrived at a clear
notion of a first cause, but in collaboration with Divinely
revealed truth in regard to God they became an impregnable
wall against the arguments of Atheism. 2
~d Watson, Theolog ical Institutes (Ne't..r York:
Philips and Hunt, 1850), I, p. 276.

2 Ibid. , pp .

273

ff.
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Watson did not ground the arguments for God 1 s. existence
in a metaphysical basis.

Foster did .

Consequently, he gave

to the subject a thorough treatment such as it had never before
been given in the Wesleyan tradition.

Miley dismissed the

philosophical approach completely, believing the basis of
theology to be scientific.3
ha ~

a philosophical basis.

He did not recognize that science
Foster however, had an answer to

the problem of the eternity of matter which Watson had ·not
seen.

11

The adjustment of matter rather than its creation,
furnishes the best proof of the divine existence. 114 No
Wesleyan theologian has been as concerned with the subject of
rational theology as was Foster.
Foster's liberal interpretation of the inspiration of
Scripture left him vulnerable on a very important issue.
This placed him on the debit side of the ledger in his
contribution to Arminian theology.
Bible he st arted from the premise

In his evaluation of the
11

that what is important is,

that the Bible be true as a whole and in every part.
alone could p ut it in peril.

11

Untruth

Thus Foster took a rational

approach to the subject without taking the statements of
Scripture upon the subject of its inspiration.

It may have

been tha t Foster, if g iven the opportunity to explain himself
in grea ter det ail, 1.;rould have assured us that his conception
3 Miley, Systematic Theology, Vol. l, pp. 22 ff.

4 Foster, Theism, p. 90.

of the inspiration of Scripture was not liberal after all.
It was the first tentative conclusion of this study that
perhaps Foster had simply inverted the terms of inspiration
and revela.t ion.

However, on further study, this tentative

conclusion could not be maintained.

The term inspiration, as

applied to Scripture, is purely a Biblical term and has no
definition apart from its usage in Scripture.
that defies exact definition.

It is a term

What the term implies in the

manner or method by which Scripture became inspired could not
be determined.

Historically, the problem of the inspira.tion

of the Scriptures did not receive elaborate treatment until
the seventeenth century when theories regarding the manner of
inspiration were developed. 5
The early church fathers had no theories as to the
inspiration of the Scriptures.6

Augustine did not regard the

truth of Scripture as bound to the words but believed the
thought was the important thing]

None of the great reformers

ma.intained a verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. g

These

reformers, however, spoke in the strongest terms of the
divinity, credibility, and infallibility of the sacred

5 John M1 Clintock and James Strong,
Cyclopedia of Biplical,
Literature, IV, o15.

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.

I

p. 614.

I

p.

g Loc. cit.

615.

Theolo~ical,

11

Inspira.tion, 11
and Ecclesiastical

,.,ritings.

The most influential men, in their utterances on

the inspiration of Scripture, treated it very simply.
Would Foster, if pressed, have spoken in strong
language of the divinity, credibility, and infallibility of
the Scriptures?

There is no clue in the Prolegomena that he

would have done so.

In regard to the truthfulness of the

Bible Foster wrote:
To its truthfulness it is not necessary that it should
be inspired in every part, unless it can be shovm that it
assumes that it is so inspired, or necessarily implies it.
This cannot be shown, nor is it in any way important to
be assumed; while, on many accounts, and for truth 1 s sake
especially, it may be importa.nt that it should not be
assumed. 9
The strongest point of emphasis, to Foster, l'la.s the
truthfulness of Scripture.

It may ha.ve been argued that since

no human mind unaided by Divine influence could be one hundred
percent accurate in its statements, entire truthfulness
implies Divine influence and consequently the entire Bible is
divinely inspired.

If this was the argument of Foster he

gave no indication of it.
The evaluation of Foster's contribution to the doctrine
of entire sanctification is largely based upon Miley's regard
for Foster 1 s Christian Purity.
the writings of Foster.

Miley made few references to

However 1 in his treatment of the

doctrine of entire sanctification, he used Foster's Christian
Purity as a basic work.

Miley regarded Foster 1 s emphasis upon

9 Foster, Prolegomena, p. 279.

the problem of the remaining sin after regeneration to be
pertinent.

Foster and Miley found different solutions to

this problem.

It has been the judgment of this study that

Miley's solution to the problem was preferable to that of
Foster.

Foster's presentation of the subject was true to the

Wesleyan tradition throughout.

It clearly presented the

cardinal points of the doctrine of entire sanctification: an
;

instantaneous work of grace subsequent to the work of
regeneration; obtainable by faith; the heart made perfect in
love.
Evaluation of l'Uley 1 s contribution.

Miley saw ti<JO

things that remained undone in Wesleyan-Arminian theology.
He saw the need of clarifying both its anthropology and its
soteriology.

The problem of evaluating the contribution of

Miley lies in the judgment of Miley's work on these two
subjects.

Were his solutions and corrections valid?

It has

been the conclusion of this study that the corrections which
Miley made to Arminian anthropology and soteriology were
valid.

Miley, by removing inherited guilt from anthropology,

has both given a clearer view of the justice of God and
removed the last leg that could uphold the Calvinistic system.
It has made Arminian anthropology thoroughly consistent with
itself.

His treatment of soteriology has exalted the

conception of the atonement.

There is, in his treatment, no

calculus of suffering whereby Christ's sufferings pay in full
the price of sufferings which elect men otherwise 'tiJould have
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endured, thus releasing them forever from condemnation.

From

the hand of Miley the atonement emerged free from the last
vestige of penal substitution.

Christ in love suffered in

man's place.

In no sense did He become guilty in taking

man's place.

This utterly repugnant notion that Christ

actually became sin in order to atone for sin was refuted by
Miley. 10 With the removal of penal substitution and the
imputation of man's guilt on Christ the props of the Calvinist
system are removed.

Miley's anthropology and soteriology

gave the strongest argument from the Arminian side which had
been presented in opposition to the Calvinist system.
Miley aspired to clarify the work of Watson whom he
regarded as the top systematic theologian in the tradition.
He realized that the one who could clarify and correct Watson
would make a real contribution to Wesleys.n theology.
been the conclusion of

~his

It has

study that Miley did clarify and

correct the work of Watson and therefore made a real
contribution to Wesleyan theology.
II.

CONCLUSION

The real purpose of this study has been to delineate
the main current of Wesleyan-Arminian theology.

The best

method of accomplishing this objective seemed to be to limit
the study to the most influential works in the movement.

It

may have seemed that the selection was an arbitrary one.
However there were only a few choices possible.

No one would

seriously question the place of influence which theological
schools like Boston University or Drew Theological Seminary
have had in the Wesleyan movement.

It "toras the chair of

theology at Drew which led in the argument against the Calvinism
of Charles Hodge.

Time has caused the influence of both

Foster and Miley, at Drew, to loom large.
Miley has not yet been transcended.

The theology of

The theologian who makes

a real contribution to the Wesleyan tradition must do so.
It has been the

pu~pose

of this study to compare

Foster and Miley with Wesley, Watson, and Pope.

In comparing

Miley's treatment of anthropology and soteriology with the
treatment given these subjects by Wesley, Watson, and Pope,
it l.vas discovered that Miley had already, in the development
of these topics, made copious references and comparisons,
along with many quotations, to the three named theologians.
What was vitally pertinent in the writings of the three men
he had already appropriated to his study.
were before the eyes in studying r.a ley.

Thus the comparisons
The same situation

was encountered in studying both Miley and Foster on the
· subject of entire sanctification.

This has considerably

lessened the impressiveness of the study as fe¥r quotations
have thus been made from the writing s of the British
theologians.

However, it has facilitated the study.
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In the matter of the philosophical basis to theology,
once the subject has been thoroughly worked there is no room
for advancement in that line.
basic

metaphy~ics.

It is impossible to expand a

On that subject, thoroughness and clarity

are the only objectives.

There are also doctrines, such as

the doctrine of the Trinity, Christology, and the relation of
reason to revelation, which have reached a settled conclusion
among evangelical theologians.

It was the purpose of this

study to determine if more subjects could not be added to the
store of those bearing the stamp of settled agreement, among
at least the Arminian theologians.

In determining the progress

made by · a theological tradition settled agreement is the chief
concern.

In determining the progress made by the Wesleyan

tradition, the thorough-going work of Foster in the
philosophical basis to theology should be added.

The work of

Miley in anthropology and sot eriology should also be added to
this fund of settled doctrines.

To back down from the

conclusions presented by these two men on the above named
subjects would mean retrogression.
It is as necessary to remain loyal to a doctrine once
conclusively established as it is to further develop hitherto
neglected doctrines.

In gaining new ground it is imperative

to be watchful that no old ground is lost.
It is the conclusion of this study that the Wesleyan
theologians in America have advanced and enriched their

tradition.

Their most influential exponents have remained

loyal to the old tradition.

An apostasy common to all the

great Protestant denominations has, in recent

year~,

been a

reason for the retarded development of theology in the line
of true progress.

This defe : ction has, in part, motivated

this study which has attempted to find the basic pillars upon
which a sound philosophy and a sound theology rest.
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